If the whole of the direct
contributions paid by a great trading or manufacturing town be divided
equally among the inhabitants, each individual will be found to pay
much more than an individual living in the country according to the
same average. The whole paid by the inhabitants of the former will
be more than the whole paid by the inhabitants of the latter- we may
fairly assume one-third more. Then the 12,700 inhabitants, or 2193
voters of the canton, will pay as much as 19,050 inhabitants, or
3289 voters of the other cantons, which are nearly the estimated
proportion of inhabitants and voters of five other cantons. Now the
2193 voters will, as I before said, send only ten deputies to the
assembly; the 3289 voters will send sixteen. Thus, for an equal
share in the contribution of the whole commune, there will be a
difference of sixteen voices to ten in voting for deputies to be
chosen on the principle of representing the general contribution of
the whole commune.
By the same mode of computation we shall find 15,875
inhabitants, or 2741 voters of the other cantons, who pay one-sixth
LESS to the contribution of the whole commune, will have three
VOICES MORE than the 12,700 inhabitants, or 2193 voters of the one
canton.
Such is the fantastical and unjust inequality between mass and
mass in this curious repartition of the rights of representation
arising out of territory and contribution.
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